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occurred as a matter of law, represents an extreme position. It would
seem to go even further than those states which provide by statute
for a presumption of intent from the mere act of selling below cost,
since the defendant might be deprived of an opportunity to negative
a violation established as a matter of law and not merely presumed.
Nevertheless, demanding that a plaintiff prove a design to under-
mine the competitive system with each and every sale below cost
might place an unrealistic burden on the plaintiff, rendering the
statute ultimately ineffective. A sale below cost may or may not be
made to injure competition. This is recognized by the exceptions
specifically provided in KRS 365.040. Placing a burden of explanation
upon the defendant who has sold merchandise or services below his
own cost should not work any undue hardship if his conduct was
directed to legitimate commercial ends. The motivations behind such
a departure from ordinarily sound business practices are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the actor and often difficult to prove. In
most cases, the jury should determine whether the defendant's
explanation is satisfactory.
The trial court should not have granted summary judgment against
the plaintiff. On the other hand, stating that as a matter of law the
statute seemed violated, and thus appearing to find conclusively the
requisite intent from the mere act of making a free trial offer of a
service, is likewise unjustified. The court may need to clarify its
position by limiting the holding strictly to this fact situation, or by
relegating much of what was said to the realm of dicta.
Eugene Mullins
FrsT CLAss MUNICn'IITY-ADEQUATE PomCE PowER TO ENACr A
PENAL CrviL RiGxiTs ORDiNANcE.-Whitson, doing business as the
Comer Restaurant, was brought before the police court on warrants
which charged him with violating the Louisville Penal Public Ac-
commodations Ordinance by his refusal to serve food to Negroes in
his restaurant. The lower court dismissed the charges on the ground
that the ordinance was unconstitutional; the Jefferson Circuit Court
held that the city of Louisville did not have sufficient police power to
enact such an ordinance. One of appellees defenses was that the
general statutory powers of first class cities set out in Ky. Rev. Stat.
83.010-.012 [hereinafter referred to as KRSI do not authorize a com-
pulsory integration ordinance because such ordinance is neither specifi-
cally authorized by the legislature nor indispensable to the operation
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of city government. Held: The ordinance is constitutional. The
court held that Louisville had adequate police power under the general
charter for cities of the first class, particularly KRS 83.010, to enact a
penal anti-discrimination ordinance. Commonwealth v. William B.
Beasy, Jr., d/b/a Dub's Fried Oyster Place & James Whitson dibla
The Corner Restaurant, 836 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1965).
This decision should significantly affect the legal strategy of the
current nation-wide movement to promote the rights and interests of
the Negroes. In the very few cases which arose previously, the validity
of a municipal civil rights ordinance turned on whether the state had
delegated to the city sufficient authority to adopt such legislation. In
Kentucky, the only grants of power to cities to pass ordinances come
in three sections of KRS; these provisions state that such cities shall
have the power to enact any ordinances not in conflict with the laws
and constitutions of the Commonwealth or the United States, which
are deemed necessary "for municipal purposes," "for the welfare of
the inhabitants," and "for the effective administration of all local
government."' The court obviously took a broad view of the subjects
which could be regulated by a city to promote the general welfare.
Because of the scarcity of previous primary or secondary authority
for such a broad interpretation of the scope of the police power of
cities, this decision is extremely relevant to the purposes of both
civil rights leaders and municipal officials who must deal with these
racial problems. The leading authority on municipal corporations, in
the most recent edition of his works, stated that a municipality is
usually without power to legislate upon, or to extend, civil rights2
Only three cases previously considered the power of a city to enact
a public accommodations ordinance. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern,
Inc.3 is nearest in point with our Kentucky situation in terms of the
position of the city involved vis-a-vis the sovereign state. In that case,
the Utah Supreme Court held that neither the statute which authorized
the city to tax, license, and regulate restaurants nor the constitution
which authorized the city to exercise all powers relating to municipal
affairs gave Salt Lake City the power to enact legislation requiring
restaurants to serve all orderly persons. Two later cases have upheld
such a municipal ordinance.4 However, the city in each of these
instances enjoyed a different relation to the sovereign power which
I IRS 83.010-.012.
27 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 24.430 (3rd ed. 1949) [hereinafter
cited as McQuillin].
3 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944).4 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson, Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953);
Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962).
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created it than did the city of Louisville to the State of Kentucky.
In the Thompson case, the Supreme Court compared the power of the
District of Columbia to that of a state; obviously there is a fundamental
difference between the District of Columbia and an ordinary munici-
pality. On the other hand, Kansas City is a municipal corporation
under a home rule charter and not, like Louisville, a city whose only
power comes from general statutory provisions in a state where there
is no home rule. It is generally accepted that municipal corporations
operating under home rule charters possess broad, if not full, police
powers in affairs of local concern. As there are no cases on the power
of a city to enact fair housing or fair employment ordinances,6 this
Kentucky decision is very important for purposes of civil rights con-
cerns because it establishes the principle that an ordinary first class
municipality has adequate police power to enact a reasonable com-
pulsory anti-discrimination ordinance.
A consideration of the nature and function of the municipal police
power helps in the development of a sound rationalization for the
doctrine of Commonwealth v. Dubs Friend Oyster Place. Cities have
always used the police power to promote the general welfare, the
traditional components of which are the health, morals, order, and
safety of the community. Accordingly, this police power has been
exercised for such familiar purposes as protective measures against
fire, nuisance, disease, and crime; and the regulation of gambling, the
sale of liquor, prostitution, waste disposal, streets, vehicles, and traffic.
During this century, there has been an obvious trend toward
extended exercises of the police power to protect the public from the
evils of industry and business and to regulate political and labor
activity in the community. Thus, at present, most courts accept the
view that the municipal police power may be exercised to promote
the general welfare in the broad sense-not only to provide for the
public order, health, safety, and morals but also to further the public
convenience and the economy of the community.7 This history shows
that the scope of the police power is neither rigid nor specifically
definable but rather always developing so as to allow the power of
government control to keep pace with the new demands of the
community. Its very function requires that the power be largely
"co-extensive with the necessities of the particular situation and
sufficiently broad, comprehensive, and elastic to meet changing social,
5 6 McQuillin § 24.33.
6 McQuillin, Municipal Fair Employment Ordinances as a Valid Exercise of
the Police Power, 39 Notre Dame Law. 607, 610 (1964).
7 Chicago, B. &. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906 ; 37 Am. jur. Municipal
Corporations § 228 (1941).
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economic, and political conditions."s Thus the exercise of the police
power cannot be limited by precedent but must be invoked over new
subjects as "social necessities relating to its ultimate objects" arise.9
This view of the police power readily accommodates municipal civil
rights ordinances as merely involving another area within the society
which has become an appropriate subject to be reached reasonably in
pursuit of the community welfare.
In this country, there is precedent for the view that legal enforce-
ment of a policy of race relations is essential for the well-being of
the community. Although today they are held invalid by reason of
violation of the federal constitution, segregation ordinances in the
past have been upheld by courts as valid exercises of the municipal
police power.10 The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a zoning
ordinance of the city of Louisville which required that races live
within defined zones."' There the court said:
Nor are we disposed to concede that the ordinance here involved
transcends the authority of the municipal legislature, or to doubt that
it constitutes a valid exercise of the police power and a reasonable and
expedient measure for the public welfare.' 2
The Supreme Court did reverse the decision' 3 but not on this point.
If the city has police power to require segregation on account of race,
it should be considered to have adequate power to prohibit discrimina-
tion because of race.
A municipal civil rights ordinance is a valid exercise of the city
police power because the reasonable regulation of race relations is
presently closely related to community welfare. We live in a period
of very intensified pressures for improvement in the social situation
of the Negro. The effects of these forces, and of the counter-forces
which they inevitably produce, are felt in every community where
there is a mix of the races. Today and tomorrow, aggravated racial
tensions will be as great a danger to the welfare of the community
as fire and disease always are, and as crime, immorality, and the
power of economic organizations can be. Just as cities early in this
century had to cope with the excesses of a corporate economy in order
to maintain the welfare of the community, so municipalities now must
deal with one of the greatest problems confronting communities all
S CG Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 276 (1941).
9 6 McQuilin § 24.10.
10 Patterson v. Taylor, 51 Fla. 275, 40 So. 493 (1906); Hopkins v. City of
Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 139 (1915).
11 Buchanan v. Warley, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472 (1915).
12 Id. at 570, 177 S.W. at 476.
13 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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over the country-the new racial situation. Failure of the cities to
provide for the necessities of this particular social condition will result
in increased social, economic, and racial tensions which will endanger
the continued peace, safety, prosperity, and general welfare of the
community. Cities which have enacted fair employment practices
ordinances have partially justified such regulation on this realistic
appraisal of the relationship between race relations and community
welfare. 14
The guiding thought behind this comment has been a conviction
that the problems of race relations are going to be with us for some
time. If the municipalities fail to act in this area, the pressures will
not cease but cause greater disruption in the community and shift
their focus to other government centers, with the result that state and
federal regulation will increase. Our American ideal is to handle social
problems on a level of government as close to the people as possible.
In the field of race relations, local legislation and enforcement are
especially desirable, because particular conditions vary from area to
area. In Commonwealth v. Dub's Fried Oyster Place, the court of
appeals has decided that municipalities have the legal authority to
deal with their own civil rights concerns. This decision thus gives the
municipalities another chance to prove that local government can still
meet problems of society in our present day.
Fred G. Karem
"CoNFLicr" BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW-ARKANSAS FuLL CREw
STATUTE PREEmPrED-Public Law 88-1081 provided for a special arbi-
tration board to make final resolution of issues in a dispute between
certain railroads and unions deadlocked in collective bargaining
procedures under the Railway Labor Act. A national railroad strike
threatened. The board was limited to the issues and parties described
in notices previously filed pursuant to the Railway Labor Act and was
to follow its rules of procedure. The arbitration award finally
promulgated under Public Law 88-108 contained rulings on numerous
issues, including crew consist. The award declared that a "minimum"
number of crewmen would be required on certain types of trains.
14 Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance to Prohibit Discriminatory Practices in
Employment, Jan. 31, 1947; Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 15, 1579-48, Jan. 30,
1950.
128 August 1963, 77 Stat. 132.
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